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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the impacts of income-sharing on the incentives 
to work and on the supply of labor in a labor-managed firm. Monitoring is 
explicitly incorporated in the measurement of labor input. The incentive 
structure in a labor-managed firm is distorted. Perfect monitoring is not 
Pareto-efficient. However, an income-sharing scheme does not change the 
argument that the incentives to work are positively correlated with the 
degree of accuracy in monitoring effort. The supply of effort in a labor­
managed firm also depends on peer pressure which is a substitute for 
monitoring. The existence of peer pressure reduces the distortion in 
incentive structure and thus improves the efficiency of time allocation. 
In addition, the supervisibility of effort in the production process 
imposes a constraint on the optimum, size .of a labor-managed firm. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The impacts of income-sharing characteristic on the incentives to 
work and the supply of labor in a labor-managed firm (LMF) 1 raise many 
theoretical disputes. On the one hand, Ward (1958), Domar (1966), Vanek 
(1969, 1970), Meade (1972), and others argue that a worker in a LMF has 
higher incentives to work than a wage worker in a conventional firm 
because he gets some direct benefits from the additional profits from his 
extra effort. Furthermore, Sen (1966), Israelsen (1980), Putterman 
(1980), and so forth argue that, if the income is distributed according 
to work, workers in a LMF tend to over-work instead of shirking. On the 
other hand, Jensen and Meckling (1979), and Williamson (1980), among 
other economists, argue that a LMF is subject to free-rider abuses 
because of its income-sharing nature; therefore, the incentives to work 
shall be low in a LMF. The empirical observations do not unequivocally 
support either view. Some authors find that the income-sharing has 
positive effects on the incentives to work in a LMF (e. g., Bradley and 
Gelb 1980; and Jones and Svejnar 1985). Others attribute the failure of 
some LMFs to the low incentives (e.g., Bradley and Clark 1972, Perkins 
and Yusuf 1984, chap. 5). 
The income-sharing scheme itself does not necessarily invite over­
working or free-rider abuses. Central to this controversy is how costly 
it is to monitor effort in a LMF (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). The pros 
implicitly assume that effort can be perfectly monitored without any 
1 
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cost. Their opponents, conversely, imply that it is too costly to 
monitor in a LMF. In this paper I try to show that the incentives to work 
in a LMF depend on the nature of the production process, namely, how 
costly it is to monitor each worker's effort in production. The income­
sharing characteristic of a LMF distorts the structure of incentives in a 
LMF. However, it does not change the fact that the incentives to work are 
positively correlated with the degree of accuracy of vertical supervision 
or monitoring exerted by the management. As in any other form of firm, a 
higher degree of accuracy of monitoring requires higher costs to perform. 
The management of a LMF thus has to balance the benefit of higher 
incentives and the additional costs arising from a higher degree of 
monitoring. Therefore, the optimum degree of monitoring in a LMF depends 
on how costly the monitoring of effort is in the production process, 
which is determined by the nature of production. If monitoring is easy, 
the incentives to work shall be high in a LMF, ceteris paribus. On the 
other hand, the free-rider abuse shall be severe if monitoring is 
difficult. But because the income-sharing characteristic alters the 
structure of incentives in a LMF, from the welfare point of view perfect 
monitoring is Pareto-inefficient. 
The income-sharing characteristic in a LMF also affects effort 
supply from the other way. In a LMF, the income of each worker depends 
not only on his own effort but also on the effort of other workers. 
Therefore, there exists a horizontal supervision or peer pressure as 
defined by Chinn (1979). This paper throws additional light on the 
interactions between vertical and horizontal supervision. It is found 
that horizontal supervision is a substitute for vertical supervision. An 
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increase in the degree of monitoring by the management in a LMF induces a 
decrease of peer pressure between member workers. The existence of peer 
pressure reduces the distortion in incentive structure and thus improves 
the efficiency of time allocation. 
The choice of optimum size of a LMF with considerations of 
monitoring costs is also discussed in this paper. Monitoring costs 
increase with the size of a LMF. Therefore, for an increasing size to be 
desirable, the gain in productivity should be able to compensate for the 
additional costs. Because of the income-sharing characteristic, the 
optimum size of a LMF is smaller than that of a conventional firm, 
ceteris paribus. Furthermore, the supervisibility of effort is found to 
be a constraint on the choice of size. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section II, several key 
concepts are defined, and basic assumptions of this paper are presented. 
Section III analyzes the economic meanings of the incentives to work and 
of peer pressure and studies the effects of a change in monitoring on the 
incentives and peer pressure in a partial context. Section IV discusses 
the optimum choices of effort contribution by individual workers and of 
degree of monitoring by the management in an equilibrium framework. In 
Sections III and IV, the number of workers in a LMF is assumed to be 
exogenously given. Section V treats the number of workers in a LMF as an 
endogenous variable and turns attentions to the choice of optimum size of 
a LMF. Finally, some concluding remarks are presented in Section VI. 
II. EFFORT, MONITORING, PEER PRESSURE, AND WORK POINTS 
This section describes the basic model of a LMF in which income is 
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distributed according to work. The novelty of this model is its formal 
inclusion of monitoring as an argument in the determination of work 
points. 
To simplify the matter, a LMF is assumed to have N identical 
workers, which will be taken as given in Sections III and IV. Every 
worker has the same ability and preference. 2 It is assumed that the 
utility index, Ui, of worker i depends on his income, Yi, effort, ei, and 
the absolute value of peer pressure, IPil. A worker is assumed to choose 
his effort contribution to maximize his utility. More concretely, it is 
assumed that: 
(1) 
Ui(.) is assumed to be twice differentiable and concave in all its 
arguments. 0 =,;; ei =,;; 1. Zero means that no effort is supplied. One 
stands for fully effective work. 3 Income is distributed from the ·LMF 
according to the ith worker's work point share, si, and the net income, 
Y, of the firm, that is, 
(2)Yi 
The work point share is a ratio between the work points accumulated by 
the ith worker, hi, and the total work points in the LMF, H. 
(3) 
The work point represents the ith worker's effort contribution that is 
perceived and credited by the management. 4 It is, therefore, a function 
of his effort supply, ei, and the degree of monitoring exerted by the 
---
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management in the I.MF, n. 
(4) 
n is defined as the degree of accuracy in metering workers' effort 
contributions. It is also a variable ranging from zero to one. When 
monitoring is perfect, n = 1. In this case, hi= h(l, ei) 
monitoring does not exist, n = 0. Under this condition, hi 
for all i, where 0 <as l; that is, if workers are not monitored, they 
are assumed to have worked equally intensively. 5 The work point function 
also has the following properties: 
8hi 
~ 0, equality holds when n O·
' 
aei 
8hi s 0, equality holds when ei l· (5)
' an 
a 2h-1 6> 0 
anaei 
As each worker is assumed to be identical, it is important to 
mention here that in equilibrium each worker will offer the same amount 
of effort and, as a consequence, hi= h, si = 1/N for every worker. 
The peer pressure on the ith worker is denoted as Pi· In a I.MF, the 
income of each worker depends not only on his own effort but also on the 
effort of the other workers. If all the other workers can benefit from 
the additional effort contributed by an individual worker, there will be 
pressure on him from the other workers to contribute more effort. In this 
case, Pi is assumed to be positive. Conversely, if all the other workers 
benefit from the reduced effort by an individual worker, there will be 
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pressure on him from the other members to reduce his effort supply. In 
this situation, Pi is assumed to be negative. An operational definition 
of peer pressure will not be given until Section III, where we discuss 
the interactions between monitoring and peer pressure. The reasons that 
peer pressure is positive in the former case and negative in the latter 
case become obvious in that definition. However, we assume here that 
positive peer pressure and negative peer pressure have a symmetrical 
disutility effect on each worker's preference. Thus, what enters the 
utility function is the absolute value of peer pressure. It is shown in 
Section IV that when peer pressure is positive, an individual worker will 
increase his effort supply and he will reduce it when peer pressure is 
negative. 7 
To concentrate on incentive aspects of a LMF, the simplest 
technology for a firm is adopted. Production requires only the total 
effort that is contributed by the members. So, 
X F(E) with FE> 0 (6) 
Xis output, Eis the total effort offered by the N individual 
workers, and Fis the production function. Eis a function of the degree 
of monitoring. 
(7) 
The rationale for this assumption will be discussed later. 
The net income for the LMF is 
(8) 
with Ci> 0, Cii > 0. i ~. N, r, 
7 
where C, the costs of monitoring, is a function of the degree of 
monitoring, ~, the size of the membership of the LMF, N, and the degree 
of difficulty in monitoring labor effort, r. r is itself a function of a 
vector of exogenous variables, such as sequential and spatial dimensions 
of the production process that affect the supervisibility of labor 
effort. An increased value of r implies that the difficulty of 
monitoring effort is raised. In addition to all the usual assumptions of 
a cost function with respect to its first and second derivatives, the 
monitoring cost function has the following properties: 
CC0; N, I') 0, (9a) 
cc~; 1, r) 0, (9b) 
CC~; N, 0) 0. (9c) 
Equation C9a) stipulates that monitoring costs are zero when no 
monitoring activities are engaged in. Equation C9b) says that monitoring 
costs are zero when a person works for himself. Since he knows exactly 
how he works, there is no need to divert any resources for the purpose of 
metering his own effort. Equation C9c) postulates that monitoring costs 
are zero when labor effort is transparent and thus can be metered 
perfectly at no cost. 
The management of a LMF is assumed to have perfect knowledge of the 
monitoring cost function, C(~; N, I'); the production function, FCE); and 
the effort supply function, EC~). Following the tradition of Ward, 
Domar, and Vanek, the objective of the management is assumed to be that 
of maximizing the average net income per worker. 8 To be precise, the 
objective function is 
8 
1 max {F[E(n)] - C(n; N, r)}. (10) 
n N 
III. MONITORING, INCENTIVES, AND PEER PRESSURR 
Economically, as in any other form of firm, a worker's incentives to 
work are the marginal income accrued to him for his contribution of an 
additional unit of effort. Nevertheless, due to the income-sharing 
characteristic, the return to an additional unit of effort has two 
components in a LMF. First, he will get a share of the increase in total 
output. Second, his share of total income becomes larger as now his 
contribution of effort in total effort increases. Whether the incentives 
are distorted upward or downward, however, depends on the degree of 
monitoring. Taking other workers' effort supplies and monitoring as 
given, we find from the partial derivative of expression (2) that the 
incentives to work for worker i can be expressed as 
FSi E + (1 )- Si · Ai · ( F - C ), (11) 
E 
where Ai 
The first term on the RHS is the gain from the increase in the production 
of the LMF, and the second term is the gain from the increase in the work 
point share. Notice that Ai has the following properties: when n = 0, Ai 
= O; when n = 1, Ai= 1. Also notice that because each worker is assumed 
to be identical, in equilibrium si in expression (11) can be substituted 
for by 1/N. 
The confusion over the incentive structure in a LMF can be easily 
understood in the context of expression (11). When monitoring is perfect 
and costless, which is implicitly assumed by Sen (1966), Israelsen 
9 
(1980), and most theoretical models of LMF, expression (11) in 
equilibrium is reduced to 
1/N. FE+ (1 - 1/N) F. (lla) 
E 
The RHS of expression (lla) is a simple weighted average between the 
marginal product and the average product of effort. As the normal 
production range is located at where the average product is greater than 
the marginal product, Sen and others thus conclude that the incentives to 
work in a LMF are distorted upward from the optimum incentives, FE. 
Perfect monitoring makes a worker over-work to compete for a larger share 
of the existing income. Therefore, perfect monitoring is Pareto­
inefficient in a LMF. If monitoring does not exist, expression (11) 
becomes 
(llb) 
In this case, a worker only gets 1/N of the marginal product of his 
effort, so the incentives are distorted downward which is what has been 
implicitly assumed by some authors on Soviet and China's collective farms 
(Bradley and Clark 1972; Perkins and Yusuf, 1984, p.79). 
The above discussions are summarized as following: 
PROPOSITION 1: Whether the incentives to work in a LMF are distorted 
upward or downward from the optimum incentives depends on the 
degree of monitoring. In the normal production range (average 
product falling), perfect monitoring results in an over­
contribution of effort in a LMF; therefore, perfect monitoring is 
10 
Pareto-inefficient. 
A. Monitoring and Incentives 
Raising the degree of monitoring will be accompanied by an increase 
in the costs of monitoring. 9 Before we study the combined effects, 
however, it is instructive to look at the separate effects that the 
degree of monitoring and the costs of monitoring have on the incentives 
to work in a I.MF. Intuitively, an increase in the degree of monitoring 
itself shall improve the incentives, as reward is related more closely to 
effort; meanwhile, an increase in the costs of monitoring shall dilute 
the incentives as each share of income becomes smaller. These intuitions 
are confirmed in our model. 
From expression (11) and applying·the assumption that each worker is 
identical, we can see that an increase in the degree of monitoring 
affects a worker's incentives to work only through the change in Ai, the 
average net product's adjusting factor. Mathematically, this partial 
derivative is 
(1 - 1/N) . ( F -C) . 8Ai (12) 
E 
Given each worker's effort contribution and the costs of monitoring, 
8Ai/8n > 0. Consequently, expression (12) is positive; that is, the 
increase in the degree of monitoring itself improves the incentives to 
work in a I.MF. 
The effect of monitoring costs on the incentives can be analyzed in 
the same way. Taking the partial derivative of expression (11) with 




Expression (13) is negative. Therefore, a rise in the monitoring costs 
itself lowers the incentives to work in a LMF. 
PROPOSITION 2. In a LMF, an increase in the degree of monitoring itself 
improves the incentives to work and the accompanying rise of the 
costs of monitoring deteriorates the incentives to work; however, in 
the management's choice range of monitoring, the total effect on 
incentives of an increase in the degree of monitoring shall be 
positive. 
The second part of this proposition holds because the objective of 
the management is to maximize the net output per worker. In choosing a 
degree of monitoring, the LMF management thus needs to consider these two 
opposite effects simultaneously. If the total effect on the incentives is 
negative, then the costs of monitoring can be reduced, and the output of 
the LMF can be increased by the decrease in the degree of monitoring. 
Such a point will necessarily be excluded from its choice set. 
B. Monitoring and Peer Pressure 
Due to the income-sharing characteristic in a LMF, a worker's income 
depends not only on his own effort but also on the other members' 
efforts. Taking the LMF as a whole, any increase in effort by any member 
is definitely desirable. The total and net outputs increase in 
consequence. Nonetheless, whether all the other workers encourage an 
individual worker to take such an action depends on how all the others' 
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incomes are affected. Chinn (1979) defines peer pressure as the 
incremental income gains that are accrued to all other members in a LMF 
and are derived from the increase in effort by an individual worker. 10 
Although Chinn has studied the effects of different distribution schemes 
and different degrees of team cohesion on peer pressure, I would like to 
examine the sensitivity of peer pressure to changes in the degree of 
monitoring. 
Mathematically, peer pressure on the ith worker, Pi, can be 
expressed as 
.( F-C).Pi (1 - 1/N)FE - (1 - 1/N) . Ai (14a) 
E 
Here the assumption that workers are identical is applied. The first term 
on the RHS is the incremental income contributed to all the other members 
in the LMF by the increase in output induced,by the ith worker's 
additional effort. The second term, which we have noticed in expression 
(11), is the incremental income that is accrued to the ith worker due to 
his increased share of work points. Hence, if what he contributes to the 
other members by his increased effort is larger than what he takes away 
by his added work point share, the other members will encourage him to 
increase effort. Otherwise, they will discourage him to increase effort. 
By examining expression (14a), we see that when the marginal product of 
effort, FE, is greater than the adjusted average net product, Ai . [(F -
C)/E], peer pressure is positive; peer pressure is negative when the 
opposite holds; and it is zero when the marginal product of effort equals 
the adjusted average net product of effort. Thus, peer pressure on a 
worker depends on which region of effort supply is relevant to him. 
13 
However, if monitoring does not exist, expression (14a) becomes 
Pi (14b) 
It is definitely positive. Everyone is better-off by pressing each other 
to work harder. 
Expression (14a) can also be rearranged as, 
(14c)Pi 
The first term on the RHS is the incremental income gain to the LMF as a 
whole by the ith worker's extra effort. The second term is the ith 
worker's incentives to work. 
Knowing the meaning of peer pressure, we will now show that, in a 
LMF, peer pressure is a substitute for monitoring in terms of their 
effects on the supply of effort. From the partial derivative of 
expression (14c) with respect to~, 
(15) 
The RHS of expression (15) is the negative of expression (12). Because 
expression (12) is a positive function of~. an increase in~ reduces 
peer pressure. 
Similarly, the effect of an increase in the costs of monitoring on 
peer pressure is just the opposite of expression (13). This can be seen 




From expressions (15) and (16), we conclude that the influences of 
monitoring terms--the degree of monitoring and the costs of monitoring-­
on the incentives and on peer pressure are opposite. The total effect of 
an increase in the degree of monitoring on the incentives should be 
positive in the relevant region of the management's decision making 
(recalling Proposition 2); hence, the total effect on peer pressure 
should be negative in the relevant region. Both monitoring and peer 
pressure affect the supply of effort in a LMF (see discussions in the 
next section); therefore, 
PROPOSITION 3: Peer pressure is a substitute for monitoring in the 
relevant region, in terms of its impacts on the supply of effort. 
When monitoring increases (decreases), peer pressure decreases 
(increases) relatively. 
IV. MONITORING, EFFORT SUPPLY, AND SUPERVISIBILITY 
In this section we seek to prove the central proposition of this 
paper, namely, that the incentives to work in a LMF depend on the 
supervisibility of effort in its production process. In other words, we 
will demonstrate that if it is easy to monitor each worker's effort, the 
incentives to work will be high; the opposite holds if effort is 
difficult to meter, ceteris paribus. The method proceeds in two steps. 
First, the choices of optimum effort supply by each worker and optimum 
degree of monitoring by the management are analyzed, given the 
supervisibility of effort in the production process. When a worker 
chooses his effort supply, he considers his own rate of substitution 
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between income and leisure, his incentives to work, and peer pressure. As 
the incentive structure is distorted in a LMF, the existence of peer 
pressure is shown to improve the efficiency of time allocation. The 
management's choice of optimum degree of monitoring has to balance the 
incentive effect and the cost effect. In the second step, comparative 
statics are applied to demonstrate the central proposition. 
A. Choice and Equilibrium 
To analyze how the management chooses the optimum degree of 
monitoring and how individual workers choose their effort supplies, we 
need to proceed in an equilibrium framework because monitoring and effort 
supplies are simultaneously determined. 
Each worker in a LMF is assumed to choose his own effort supply to 
maximize his utility. From expression (1), with the degree of monitoring, 
the cost of monitoring, and all the other workers' effort supplies given, 
the necessary condition for worker i's utility maximization is 
ui uiayi 8pi
ei Pi+ sgn(pi) (17) 
ui uiaei aei 
Yi Yi 
for i = 1, 2, N . . ' 
ui is the ith worker's marginal disutility of work; -ui can then 
ei ei 
be interpreted as the marginal utility of leisure. Therefore, the LHS is 
the marginal rate of substitution between income and leisure. Welfare 
optimality requires that this rate be equal to FE, the marginal product 
of effort. The first term on the RHS is the marginal income of effort or 
the incentives to work, which may be distorted upward or downward from 
FE. The second term on the RHS is an adjustment for the existence of peer 
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pressure. It assumes the same sign as peer pressure. Recalling expression 
(14a), the sign of peer pressure on the ith worker is positive when his 
effort supply is located in the region where FE - Ai . [(F-E)/E] < 0. By 
expression (11), his incentives to work are distorted downward in this 
region. Therefore, the existence of positive peer pressure increases the 
incentives to work and thus alleviates the distortion. On the other hand, 
when his effort supply is located in the region where FE - Ai . [(F­
E)/E] > 0, his incentives to work are distorted upward; however, peer 
pressure assumes a negative value (see expression 14a) in this case and 
thus the existence of peer pressure reduces his incentives to work. Peer 
pressure once again reduces the distortion. Peer pressure is zero if his 
effort supply is located at the point where FE - Ai . [(F-E)/E] = 0. At 
this point his incentives to work as well as time allocation are optimum. 
Therefore, 
PROPOSITION 4: The existence of peer pressure in a LMF reduces the 
distortion of incentive structure and thus improves the efficiency 
of time allocation between work and leisure. 
If the utility gain for worker i from the improvement in time 
allocation outweighs the disutility of peer pressure, the existence of 
peer pressure is a Pareto-improvement because, by definition, all the 
other workers also gain from the peer pressure on the ith worker. 
The determination of the degree of monitoring is modeled by 
permitting the management to decide how much monitoring is optimum for 
maximizing the average net income per worker, with workers making 
marginal adjustments in their decisions about how much effort to 
contribute. The relationships between the management and the workers are 
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supposed to be of Stackelberg type. The management takes the reaction 
functions of the individual workers as given, while individual workers 
take the actions of the management as given. For the determination of 
the optimum degree of monitoring, therefore, it is essential to know the 
properties of workers' effort supply functions. 
The relationships among the workers are assumed to be of Cournot­
Nash type. Each worker takes all the other workers' efforts as given. As 
there are N workers in the LMF, we will have N first-order conditions 
from each worker's utility maximization. The N first-order conditions 
may be solved to provide N effort supply functions: 
ei ei(n, e1, ... ' ei-1• ei+l• ... , eN) 
(18) 
for i = 1, 2, ... , N. 
Then, for a given n, assuming the Nash equilibrium is unique, ef = e(n) 
for all i (as workers are identical). Thus the .effort supply function 
for the LMF as a whole is 
E (19) 
The task now is to show that E(n) is an increasing function of n in the 
relevant region of management's choice. Proposition 2 posits that the 
total effect on incentives of an increase in the degree of monitoring 
should be positive in the relevant region of management's choice. The 
incentives, being the marginal income of effort, can be treated as the 
shadow price of leisure. When the price of leisure increases, each 
worker will substitute leisure for work. Meanwhile, the simultaneous 
increase in the costs of monitoring reduces each worker's net income. 
18 
Therefore, the income effect on the effort supply is also positive. 
Because both the substitution effect and the income effect are positive 
in the relevant region, the effort supply for the LMF as a whole 
increases as a result of an increase in the degree of monitoring. 
Although the increase in monitoring will simultaneously be accompanied by 
a decrease in peer pressure, which has a negative effect on the effort 
supply, the monitoring effect will necessarily dominate the peer pressure 
effect in the management's choice set. 11 Thus, 
PROPOSITION 5: Within the management's choice set of monitoring, the 
supply of total effort is a positive function of monitoring. 
From expression (10), assuming an interior solution exists, the 
first-order condition for the maximization of a LMF 's objective is 
0 (20) 
The first term on the LHS is the increase in output arising from the 
increase in effort supply which can be called the incentive effect. The 
second term is the increase in costs of monitoring which will be called 
the cost effect. 
PROPOSITION 6: If an interior solution exists, the management's choice 
of optimum degree of monitoring will equate, at the margin, the 
incentive effect to the cost effect. 
B. Supervisibility, Degree of Monitoring, and Incentives 
So far we have demonstrated that the income-sharing characteristic 
in a LMF can distort the incentive structure upward or downward depending 
on the degree of monitoring exercised by the management. However, in 
19 
choosing the optimum degree of monitoring, the management has to consider 
both the incentive effect and the cost effect. How costly an additional 
degree of monitoring is depends on how difficult it is to monitor effort 
in the production process. Therefore, the incentives to work, high or 
low, actually hinge on the supervisibility of effort in the production 
process. Although supervisibility of effort is exogenous to a LMF, at 
least in the short run and without changing the sizes of a LMF, different 
LMFs may have different degrees of difficulty in monitoring effort. The 
difference in supervisibility may explain why the performances of LMFs 
are so diverse. To investigate how supervisibility affects the incentives 
to work in a LMF, we first see how it affects the management's choice of 
optimum degree of monitoring. Differentiating expression (20) totally 




The denominator of expression (21) is just the second-order condition of 
management's maximization problem. It is negative by assumption. The 
numerator is positive because, as the difficulty of monitoring, r, 
increases, it becomes harder to monitor effort. Thus, the marginal cost 
of an additional degree of monitoring increases as a result. The sign of 
expression (21) is thus negative. The next two propositions follow 
immediately from expression (21). 
PROPOSITION 7: If there are two LMFs identical in every aspect except in 
the supervisibility of effort in their production processes, the 
management in the LMF with higher supervisibility chooses a higher 
degree of monitoring than the management in the LMF with lower 
20 
supervisibility. 
PROPOSITION 8: If there are two LMFs identical in every aspect except in 
the supervisibility of effort in their production processes, workers 
in the LMF with higher supervisibility have higher incentives to 
work than workers in the lower supervisibility LMF. 
Proposition 8 holds because, as stated in Proposition 2, the 
incentives to work are positively correlated with the degree of 
monitoring. 
V. SUPERVISION AND THE OPTIMUM SIZE OF A LMF 
This section investigates the effect of the income-sharing 
characteristic on the optimum size of a LMF. This issue is especially 
relevant in socialist countries. Most collective farms (one specific form 
of LMF) in socialist economies are large with low productivity. As 
Schultz (1964, p. 113) points out, such gigantic farms are established 
out of certain political motivations backed by particular beliefs about 
"returns to scale." As the costs of monitoring increase with the size, 
the low incentives to work in collective farms may arise from the fact 
that they are too large. However, some analytical models, overlooking 
monitoring problems, suggest that the incentives to work increase with 
size (see Israelsen 1980). In the last two sections, we have avoided the 
problem of size by assuming that a LMF is bestowed with fixed members. 
In this section, that assumption is relaxed, and the problems of size and 
other related issues are addressed. 
A. the Choice of Optimum Size 
Intuitively, two factors need to be considered in the choice of 
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size. First, there must be some productivity gain related to larger size. 
Second, the costs of monitoring increase as the size becomes larger. In a 
conventional firm the optimum choice of size is at the point where the 
increase in productivity just compensates for the rise in monitoring 
costs. However, the optimum choice of size will be smaller for a LMF 
because of its income-sharing characteristic. To illustrate this choice 
of size, let us assume that the management is bestowed with the authority 
to recruit new members if the size of the LMF is too small or not to 
replace the retired members if the size is too large. 12 We also assume, 
following the convention of Ward (1958), that every worker supplies a 
fixed amount of effort. 13 The problem for the management is 
max y ~[F(N; e) - C(N; ~, r)] (22) 
N N 
subject to N ~ 1. 
Assuming that an interior solution exists, the first-order condition 
for maximization is 
F - C 
(23) 
N 
The optimum size for a conventional firm locates at the point where FN -
CN =0. This verifies the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 9: Due to the income-sharing characteristic, the optimum 
size of a LMF is smaller than a conventional firm, ceteris 
14paribus . 
From expression (23), we see that if an interior solution exists, 
the optimum size of a LMF is determined at the point where the net 
marginal product of size equals the net average product of size. Other 
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things equal, if the returns to size are larger, the optimum size of a 
LMF will be larger.ls 
B. Supervisibility and the Optimum Size 
A moment's reflection on expression (23) suggests that the optimum 
size of a LMF should be smaller if it is more difficult to monitor effort 
in its production process. However, due to the income-sharing 
characteristic, this intuition holds only with some additional 
assumptions on the cost function. Ignoring the possibility of a binding 
constraint, differentiating equation (23) totally with respect to N and r 
and rearranging yields 
dN -CNr N + Cr (24) 
dr (CNN - FNN)N 
The sign of the denominator is positive. So dN/dr has the same 




This bewildering situation arises from the fact that two things happen at 
the same time when the difficulty of monitoring increases. First, the 
monitoring costs are something like a tax on a LMF. As Ward (1958) has 
demonstrated, in a LMF, when the tax increases, it is beneficial for the 
existing members of the LMF to recruit more workers in order to reduce 
the burden of tax on each member. Thus, the size of the LMF should 
increase. Second, as the marginal cost of monitoring increases, the net 
----
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marginal product of size decreases; therefore, the size of the I.MF should 
be reduced. The final result depends on which force dominates. 
Fortunately, expression (25) depends on the relative magnitudes of CNr 
and Cr. Therefore, the key to the answer is the structure of monitoring 
cost function. One possible functional form that meets all the 
requirements of equations (8) and (9a)-(9c) is a general Cobb-Douglas 
function: 
C(1r, N, r) (26) 
where a,~. and~ need not be constant. However, in the relevant region, 
a and~ are required to be greater than 1 in order to meet the condition 
If this general Cobb-Douglas function form is assumed, 
N~ > 1 . (27) 
Cr N - 1 
Consequently, the sign of dN/dr is negative. To the extent that 
any function can be locally approximated by a general Cobb-Douglas 
function, this result should also hold, in the relevant region, for any 
cost function with the properties stipulated by equations (8) and (9a), 
(9b), (9c). We thus conclude, 
PROPOSITION 10: The optimum size of a I.MF is negatively correlated 
with the difficulty of monitoring in its production process, ceteris 
paribus. 
If the effort in the production process is easy to monitor, the 
optimum size of a I.MF will be large; if monitoring is difficult to 
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implement, the optimum size will be small, other things equal. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, I have studied the impacts of the vertical and 
horizontal supervision in a LMF on the incentives to work, the supply of 
labor, and the optimum size of a LMF. I hope this paper has shed some 
light on the crucial issue of supervision in a LMF, which has long been 
neglected in the formal models of a LMF. 
Monitoring and peer pressure are only two of many factors that 
affect the incentives, labor supply, as well as the optimum size of a 
LMF. Other factors, such as the proportion between distribution 
according to need and distribution according to work, relative price of 
output, fixed charges on a LMF, and so on, also have important impacts on 
these issues. 16 However, supervision may very well be one of the most 
important factors in the determination of individual incentives and thus 
the success or failure of a LMF. Successful examples of LMFs are often 
found in the manufacturing or processing sectors (see Jones and Svejnar 
1982, 1985; Stephen 1982); however, the performances of LMFs in 
agricultural production are often dismal (See Bradley and Clark 1972; 
Johnson and Brooks 1983; Perkins and Clark 1984; and Carter 1984). I 
think that one of the main reasons is differences in the supervisibility 
of labor in production processes. Manufacturing and processing are 
highly specialized, are concentrated in small areas, and have 
standardized routines. It is much easier for the manager to monitor the 
workers' performances and to relate the rewards to their efforts. 
Therefore, the incentives to shirk are smaller in these sectors. In 
agriculture, however, production is widely dispersed and involves long 
25 
periods of production and diversified jobs. It is very costly to provide 
close monitoring in agriculture. Because of the high costs of monitoring, 
the optimum degree of monitoring in an agricultural cooperative must be 
low; the monetary differences between a job done poorly and one done 
competently are thus little (Johnson and Brooks 1983, p. 179). 
Therefore, the incentives to work as well as the productivity are both 
very low. 17 
The efficient mode of organization is the one which economizes on 
transaction costs (Williamson 1980). The costs of monitoring are a major 
component of transaction costs. Because of its income-sharing 
characteristic and the existence of peer pressure, a LMF can be a 
superior way to provide the incentives to work if (a) the returns to size 
are fairly large and at the same time it is too costly to provide any 
meaningful monitoring, or (b) monitoring is not very costly. If the 
returns to size are limited and the costs of monitoring are high, a LMF 
is not an efficient mode of organization. Agriculture belongs to the last 
category. The efficiency of American farms, compared with those of the 
Soviet Union, should be attributed to the fact that most farms in the 
United States are owner-operated farms, which have little problems of 
properly monitoring, metering, and rewarding labor effort. 18 
Nevertheless, most socialist countries, including China in the past, 
established gigantic collective farms and thus exacerbate the 
difficulties of monitoring. China has made a series of major reforms 
since 1978. A new institution called "the household responsibility 
system" has replaced the production teams with the individual household 
as the unit of production. The difficulty of monitoring in the 
26 
production team system is identified empirically as the main reason for 
this institutional change (Lin 1987a) and the incentives to work are 
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1The term "labor-managed firm" (LMF) is used in this paper to 
designate entities that are called "worker-managed firm", "self-managed 
firm", "producers' cooperative", "collective farm", or "production team" 
in the economic literature. 
2For the case of heterogeneous workers, see an early, detailed 
version of this paper (Lin 1985). All the propositions in this paper are 
not altered, except wording, by the introduction of heterogeneity of 
preferences. However, the analyses become very complicate because workers 
need to be classified into three categories, namely, income-preferring, 
leisure-preferring, and average workers. 
32 
3The same specification is adopted in Calvo and Wellisz (1978). 
4The management in a LMF refers to the managers who are hired by the 
workers' council in a competitive market to perform the monitoring 
function. The management monitors workers' effort instead of their 
marginal product because the principle of income distribution is "to each 
according to his work." 
5h(.) is assumed to be a nonstochastic function in this paper. At 
first glance, it might appear to be preferable to make it stochastic. 
However, si would become a ratio of two random variables. The 
expectations of si as well as Yi might fail to exist. Consequently, the 
problem became unsolvable without making other more strained assumptions 
(see Putterman 1985). h(.) may be interpreted as a "certainty 
equivalence" of a stochastic work point function. 
6one of the possible .functional forms which have all the required 
properties is: 
7Peer pressure on a worker is assumed to incur no cost on the other 
workers in the LMF. This is admittedly a somewhat strained assumption. 
make it for two reasons. First, Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1986) have 
argued that supervision as a by-product of the production process has the 
lowest cost. Peer pressure is a by-product of the production process; 
therefore, this assumption may not be too unrealistic. Nevertheless, it 
greatly simplifies the expositions. Second, it can be verified that the 
propositions in this paper can be extended in a straight-forward fashion, 
I 
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with some minor changes in the wording, to the case that cost of peer 
pressure is included. 
8When the members of a I.MF are fixed, it makes no difference in 
maximizing average net income or total net income. We can also make the 
objective of the management to maximize both net average income and 
other elements of individual satisfaction instead of average net income 
alone. However, this would yield a structure that is identical for 
analytical purposes, but at the cost of much added complexity. 
9The workers' council either has to hire more managers or a more 
competent manager with higher salary to perform it. 
10To be precise, the incremental income gain is the incentives for 
the other members to put peer pressure on the ith worker. Here the 
implicit assumption is that peer pressure is a linear transformation of 
the incentives for applying peer pressure with the slope equal to unity 
and starting from the origin. I owe this point to Charles Kahn. 
11rf, at the management's choice set of monitoring, this claim does 
not hold, then effort supply can be increased and cost of supervision can 
be reduced by the decrease in the degree of monitoring. As management's 
objective is maximizing the average net output, such a point will be 
excluded from the management's choice set. 
12The asymmetry between hiring and dismissing workers in a I.MF 
arises from the fact that the management in reality has difficulty to 
decide who should be dismissed even if income for those that remain could 
be increased by dismissing some, as Robinson (1967) pertinently argued in 
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her comments on Ward's and Domar's papers. However, the size of a LMF can 
be reduced by not replacing retired members although it may take longer 
period of time to reach the optimum level. 
13This is a typical assumption made in the literature dealing with 
the size of a LMF (see Ward 1958, Maurice and Ferguson 1972, Miyazaki and 
Neary 1983). The problem becomes intractable if effort is a choice 
variable. Also, for the simplicity of exposition, the degree of 
monitoring is assumed given. 
14ward (1958), Vanek (1970), and others find that the income­
sharing property also makes a LMF choose a smaller size than a 
conventional firm when profits are positive. 
15rn this model only effort is included in the production function 
so there is no difference between size and scale. If the production 
function includes several inputs, the same conclusion can be extended to 
scale in a straight-forward fashion. 
16For an excellent overview of the effects of other factors, see 
Bonin and Futterman, 1986. 
l7Johnson and Brooks (1983) also identify bureaucratic interference 
in farm decision making, poor quality inputs, lack of a smoothly 
functioning supply system of non-farm inputs, distorted price incentives, 
and lack of efficient rural labor markets as reasons for the low factor 
productivity in Soviet agriculture. 
35 
18The average number of worker per farm in the Soviet Union was 
about 515 for collective farms and about 550 for state farms (Johnson and 
Brooks, 1983, p.4). In the U.S., it was 1.6 in 1979 (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, 1980, p. 431). As pointed out by Bradley and Clark (1972), 
the emergence of American corporate farms does not invalidate this 
conclusion. American corporate farms are large in terms of total assets 
and scale, but they typically employ only small numbers of permanent 
workers. They are also most successful in production that is not 
spatially dispersed and in using capital-intensive techniques in which 
the problems of monitoring are minimal. 
